Comparative Philosophy Volume 11, No. 2 (2020): 90-112
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 / www.comparativephilosophy.org
https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2020).110207

IZUTSU’S ZEN METAPHYSICS OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS
VIS-À-VIS CARTESIAN COGITO
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ABSTRACT: Chief amongst the issues Toshihiko Izutsu broached is the philosophisation of
Zen Buddhism in his book Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. This article aims to
critically compare Izutsu’s reconstruction of Zen metaphysics with another metaphysical
tradition rooted in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. Putting Izutsu’s terminological choices into the
context of Zen Buddhism, we review his argument based on the subject-object distinction and
establish a comparison with the Cartesian cogito. A critical analysis is conducted on the
functional relationship between subject and object in Izutsu’s metaphysics of Zen (meditation).
This is examined step by step from the perspective of Descartes’ Meditations. On the one hand,
we focus on prima facie similarities in meditative and reflective methodologies used by the Zen
and Cartesian approaches. On the other, we highlight some unequivocal differences in the
metaphysical role of the subject: an indubitable foundation for the epistemological access to
objective reality (Descartes), and an introspective apprehension of the egoless void or absolute
reality (Zen).
Keywords: Cartesian Metaphysics, consciousness, intentionality, meditation, Toshihiko Izutsu,
Zen Buddhism

This article critically evaluates Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism (1977),
originally written in English, by Japanese philosopher, Toshihiko Izutsu (1914–1993).
As a scholar of Eastern religious and philosophical traditions, Izutsu focused
particularly on Islam, Daoism, and Buddhism in a distinctive comparative approach.1
________________________
ODA, TAKAHARU: PhD Candidate in philosophy, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. Email:
odat@tcd.ie
BUCCI, ALESSIO: PhD Student in philosophy, University of Turin, Italy. Email:
alessio.bucci@unito.it
1

However, any general East-West comparison is necessarily historically imprecise. On the scope of
Izutsu’s comparative works on Eastern thought and mystical philosophy (broadly conceived), including
Islamic (e.g. ‘irfān, ‘knowledge of Allāh’; the Sufi concept of waḥdat al-wujūd, ‘oneness/unity of being’),
Persian, Semitic, ancient Greek philosophies, see Krummel 2019, 558–559; Nakamura 2009, 155; Izutsu
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In this spirit, we will present a comparative analysis of Zen Buddhist and Descartes’
metaphysics of I-consciousness2 and the aboutness (intentionality) of their conscious
states to objects. Therein lies an interpretative problem in Izutsu’s philosophy that we
will discuss.
By the phrase ‘philosophy of Zen’, Izutsu meant “the philosophical potential
hidden in the Zen experience of reality” under the guise of the incompatibility between
philosophy and Zen (1977, x). 3 Although any theorizations of Zen may eschew
Buddhist ‘enlightenment’ (in Japanese, kenshō/satori), 4 we scrutinise Izutsu’s
metaphysical, non-ontological (i.e. de-ontologized or de-essentialized) attempt
constructed on linguistic and epistemic accounts of the Zen self or I-consciousness. We
take it that his Zen Buddhist explanation is “metaphysical” insofar as it concerns the
“articulation of reality” (1977, xi), in line with traditional and contemporary approaches
within the Western philosophical and linguistic framework. Moreover, based on
Izutsu’s understanding, we reveal how and why Zen I-consciousness can refer to, or
relate to, objects (mental representations or ideas), particularly empty ideas like
void/nothingness. This is where our critical approach is taken in terms of Izutsu’s
problematic assumption of “a functional relationship between the subject and the
object” in his Zen metaphysics (1977, 8). In our final analysis, the intentionality
(aboutness or relation) of the Zen subject to their object of thought shall be newly
appreciated in a constructive comparison with another type of metaphysical subject,
the Cartesian cogito.
In this constructive and deconstructive comparison, we approach Izutsu’s Zen
metaphysics with Réne Descartes’ (1596–1650) metaphysical notion of cogito in the
Meditations, or the indubitable thinking self. Thereby one can see why the Cartesian
subject and Zen subject take similar steps towards each meditational consequence: egoconstruction (certainty) or ego-deconstruction (nirvāṇa). The comparison of these
philosophical consequences per se might be well known, whereas we show that a
careful clarification of the meditator’s step by step process to each goal is worth
considering. This is because we can understand to what degree similarly and
dissimilarly the two different subjects proceed with the respective meditations in
1977, 21, n. 18; 1993, 410–411; Works V, 15–17; X, 634–635. We believe the East-West division is no
longer tenable but this remains controversial in the twenty-first century. As to why a cross-cultural,
borderless, cosmopolitan philosophy is better promoted, see Garfield 2002, 152–155; Chakrabarti &
Weber 2016, 238: “climb[ing] up to the level playing field of global combative cooperative critical
creative philosophy…throw away the ladder of comparison.”
2
We coin the term ‘I-consciousness’ to disambiguate Izutsu’s analysis from debates regarding the self
in philosophy of mind and the use of the term ‘ego’ in psychology (Izutsu 1977, 65–67).
3
The Japanese zen (in Chinese, chán 禪) is a transliteration of jhān, from the Prākṛt jhāna with the final
sound a dropped off (in Saṃskṛt, dhyāna). It means spiritual ‘meditation’ or ‘contemplation’ through
physical exercises. See Ui 1935, ii.
4
There are no equivalent translations between satori/kenshō and ‘enlightenment’/‘illumination’ (both
terms are interchangeable in the sense of ‘lucid awakening’), but we follow the conventional translations
in English given the light metaphor. This is a figurative notion; we adhere to the meaning of a meditative
experience of light in (Zen) Buddhism. On the textual sources and practical reports of light, see Lindahl
et al. 2014, 6–7.
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relation to their objects of thought (ideas). With reference to historical Zen Buddhism
and Cartesianism,5 we engage with an in-depth comparison of the two traditions as it
concerns the subject-object distinction in the case of meditation. Overall, what we stand
to gain from this comparison will be an insight into meditation itself as an approach to
philosophical inquiry (in view of the respective logic, language, epistemology, and
metaphysics).
To this end, the article is divided into four sections: §1 delineates Izutsu’s
philosophization of Zen Buddhism by introducing fundamental Mahāyānist concepts;
§2 explains early modern French philosopher Descartes’ notion of I-consciousness via
Izutsu’s criticism thereof. By cultivating Descartes’ approach to intellectual
illumination by analogy with the six-day Creation (Rorty 1986), step by step, §3 sets
out the degree of commonalities between Zen and Cartesian meditations. Finally, §4
hammers out the contradiction between the two types of meditation, or two types of
metaphysical I-consciousness, thereby analyzing the two intentional modes in relation
to their objects.
1. IZUTSU’S PHILOSOPHISATION OF ZEN BUDDHISM
This first section introduces the basic Zen tenets of Mahāyāna Buddhism, such as “nomind” and “void”, in a bid to understand Izutsu’s attempt at the philosophization of
Zen Buddhism. Izutsu begins his argument stating (1977, 8):
The most fundamental philosophical assertion of Zen at the outset is that there is a
functional relationship between the subject and the object, the knower and the known
[emphasis added]. Zen begins by recognizing a very close correlation between the state of
consciousness of the subject and the state of the objective world which the subject
perceives. This correlation between subject and object is of an extremely subtle, delicate,
and dynamic nature…between the ego and the world.

The above quote indicates that the objective world that we perceive is structurally
determined by the perception of the subject, or our ego-consciousness, which we call
‘I-consciousness’. This known world hinges on the way the knower cognises it, for
“Zen…always recognizes …the subject or the ego to be the determining factor” (Izutsu
1977, 8). Thus, Izutsu applies this subject-object epistemic relation to his metaphysical
theorization of Zen.
Here, one can first see Izutsu’s assimilation of the terms used in so-called Western
philosophy, including those of Aristotle, Descartes, Heidegger, and Bertrand Russell
(1977, 11). Whilst he does not deal with any problem of predicates, Izutsu’s
philosophical starting point is the distinction between subject and object. However, the
terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’ themselves are not disputed from any Buddhist
perspectives, nor are they noted in the original Saṃskṛt and Pāḷi languages of Buddhist
5

There has been a historical connection between the Cartesian cogito and Buddhist philosophy in Japan.
On the multiple receptions and interpretations of Cartesianism in Japanese intellectual history including
Zen Buddhism, see Bonneels & Derenne 2017.
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texts. In fact, the two terms lend themselves to the linguistic framework of Western
philosophy in Izutsu’s Zen philosophization. To this effect, Izutsu’s book (1977) was
intended for the comparison with Western philosophy in English, whereas we can see
the extent to which his translation and application of Buddhist terms were validly
convincing or not. Granted the Western use of philosophical terms and linguistic
implication, then, we will overview the Zen Buddhist concepts that he interpreted. The
order of our discussion of the following doctrines has neither a degree of importance
nor hierarchy, since Buddhist notions are so interlinked and coalesced with one another.
The first is the Zen doctrine of ‘no-mind’ (Ch. wú-xīn; Jp. mushin 無心). This is a
metaphysical and psychological state in which the meditator apprehends, or directly
experiences, original or absolute reality. According to Izutsu (1977, 15):
The “no-mind” is a psychological state in which the mind finds itself at the highest point
of tension,6 …[a]s an oft-used Zen expression goes: the consciousness illumines itself in
the full glare of its own light [emphasis added].7 In this state, the mind knows its object so
perfectly that there is no longer any consciousness left of the object; the mind is not even
conscious of its knowing the object.

Thus, Izutsu regards the Zen meditator’s mind as “supra-consciousness” at the
culmination of one’s “self-illumination” (1977, 16–17). This is not an unconscious
state, but a fully conscious state of one’s absolute selfhood as egolessness.8 In other
words, the supra-consciousness in meditation self-illuminates as internally sinking into
“no-mind”, to the degree to which one’s “self-essence” (Sk. svabhāva; ātman) is deontologized as “lacking self-essence” (niḥsvabhāva, “void”). 9 This no-mind
perspective, with no attachment to svabhāva, pertains to the concept of void, discussed
below.
The second doctrine concerns the “void” or “emptiness” (Sk. śūnyatā; Ch. kōng;
Jp. kū 空 ). The Mādhyamika (“adherents of the Middle Way”) like Nāgārjuna,
6

Further interpreting Izutsu’s discourse, we take it that this metaphysical-psychological state in Zen
meditation refers to nothing ontological in the Cartesian senses of substance and consciousness,
reworked from Aristotelian scholasticism (Baker & Morris 1996, 60–69, 101–112). This Zen state rejects
any kind of persistent being in Zen meditation. In other words, ‘no-mind’ in Zen enlightenment is a deontologized state (neither existence nor non-existence), whereas it can be metaphysically and
psychologically interpreted as a lucidly clear state of apprehending absolute reality or egoless void.
7
One of the critical problems in Izutsu’s Zen philosophization is a possible misinterpretation of the light
metaphor from ambiguous sources. Notably, in the quoted Zen expression (Izutsu 1977, 15), we could
not find from where Izutsu interpreted and defined the illumination of consciousness.
8
Izutsu (1977, 16, n. 15) thus references the Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra (Diamond Sūtra, his
translation): “one should never let an abiding mind emerge; a mind thus non-abiding one should let
emerge.” This explains the ‘void’ of all things, including one’s own ego, to the effect that the assertion
of ego is positionless.
9
As with many Buddhist traditions, Zen meditation attempts to let go of any svabhāva (“self-subsistent
and permanently fixed essence”) in view of Buddha’s teaching in Pāḷi: sabbe dhammā anattā, i.e. “all
things are egoless” (Izutsu 1977, 13; Dhammapāda, verse 279). The Zen doctrine of ‘no-mind’ is an
extension of the early Buddhist doctrine of “no-ego” or “no-self” (Sk. anātman; Jp. muga 無我). See
Kasulis 1981, 44.
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semantically took a positionless position that language does not correspond to
language-independent objects. Thereby they criticiszed the older Abhidharma tradition
that ontologised the svabhāva of a ‘conditioned object’ (saṃskṛta dharma), which was
assumed to depend on causes and conditions. Thus, following in the tradition of the
Mādhyamika, the Zen concept of kong/kū (‘void’) is likewise de-ontologized. Overall,
even when the void is considered absolute ‘nothingness’ in the Sino-Japanese context
that Izutsu mentions (1977, 27–32, etc.), we agree with the view that the term śūnyatā
does not mean the nothing, but “refers neither to existence nor to nonexistence… It is
a serious misnomer to identify the ontological position [emphasis added] of Mahāyāna
texts as a species of nihilism” (Huntington 1989, 18, n. 5).10 Following Nāgārjuna,
therefore, Izutsu (1977, 106) argues that the term śūnyatā refers to “the original
metaphysical state of absolute reality where there are no falsely posited, fixed things”.
As such, it is “not a purely negative ontological state of there being nothing…it is a
plenitude of being…as a crystallization of the whole spiritual energy contained
therein…the true, absolute ego as Zen Buddhism understands it” (1977, 82). In this
sense, the “void” represents the de-ontologized state of no-mind (niḥsvabhāva), which
relates to “mindfulness” (Sk. smṛti; Jp. nen 念) in Zen meditation. In other words, by
practicing this meditative mindfulness in daily life, śūnyatā is ultimately realized to be
the same as aśūnyatā (‘non-void’) and tathatā (“is-ness” or “suchness”), as typically
featured in Mahāyāna Buddhism (Thich 1974, 106–108; Izutsu 1977, 4, 101).
Therefore, in this Buddhist egoless supra-consciousness of “no-mind”, one may
ultimately or truly experience the enlightenment of absolute “void” to which one can
relate. This de-ontological doctrine of “void” is supported by the following account of
causal relationship.
The third doctrine of (Zen) Buddhism is the notion of “dependent arising” (Sk.
pratītyasamutpāda; Ch. yuan-qǐ; Jp. engi 緣起). Izutsu (1977, 23) clarifies this as a
condition where “everything comes into being and exists as what it is by virtue of the
infinite number of relations it bears to other things…[as] a system based upon the
category of relatio, in contrast to…the Platonic-Aristotelian system which is based on
the category of substantia.” Historically, refuting the existence of substance-svabhāva,
the Mādhyamika embraced the pratītyasamutpāda in support of śūnyatā (Westerhoff
2009, 31, n. 53). Put another way, Buddhist metaphysics of causation (‘dependent
arising’) under “impermanence” (Sk. anityā, ‘phenomenal arising and ceasing’) is not
rooted in “self-essence” (svabhāva), but in the relation of things, which are in reality
‘void’. This indicates that de-ontologising Zen Buddhism is in contradiction with the
Aristotelian-scholastic ontology of the substance and nine accidents, from which I10

As rightly observed (Izutsu 1977, 59, n. 11), a paradigmatic change occurred when Sengzhao (374–
414) translated śūnyatā (“void”/“emptiness”) in Saṃskṛt into kong in Chinese, through his Buddhist
master Kumārajīva (344–413). The Zen/Chan Buddhist concept of kong (“void” but also “emptiness” or
“egolessness”) was substantially influenced by Sengzhao’s previous education in Laozi’s Daoist concept
of wu (“nothingness” as the ultimate cause of creation; Jp. mu 無). More historically, the early Indian
Mahāyānist concept of śūnyatā denotes niḥsvabhāva, the absence of svabhāva (“essence” or “inherent
existence”), as espoused by Nāgārjuna (approximately the second century). See also Izutsu 1977, 104–
106; Kasulis 1981, 39; Garfield 2002, 66–68; Westerhoff 2009, 19–25, 38, n. 87.
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consciousness in Cartesian substance dualism (of the mind and body) emerged (Baker
& Morris 1996, 110, n. 137).
Fourthly, Izutsu construes another Mahāyānist metaphysical doctrine of
tathāgatagarbha (Ch. rú-lái-zàng; Jp. nyoraizō 如來藏), which he translates as “the
womb of absolute reality”, or the matrix permanently actualised through all the
phenomenal forms of things (1977, 20–21). By using the linguistic formula “I see this”
(subject sees object) as a springboard, Izutsu reconstructs the tathāgatagarbha (1977,
20–25). In this absolute metaphysical reality of I-consciousness, Zen experience is
never mere theory but immediate reality itself. As Thich Nhat Hanh observes, “Zen is
not the study of Zen; Zen is life. Zen is direct contact with reality” (1974, 131). In fact,
for his metaphysical-epistemological analysis, Izutsu befittingly interprets Zen
literature. Specifically, he deploys the master-disciple anecdotes of kōan,11 whereby he
unveils a hidden linguistic principle – (I see) in brackets.12 By this he means that the
Zen ‘supra-consciousness’ constantly functions through the subject/ego in the objective
world (matrix) of tathāgatagarbha. This supra-conscious matrix is formulated
according to (1) the subject or ego S, and (2) the object O, respectively (Izutsu 1977,
21):
(1) (S →) s
or: (I SEE) myself.
(2) (S →) o
or: (I SEE) this.

In both linguistic formulas of the verb SEE, based on the subject-object semantics and
syntax, Izutsu intends to explain the epistemological and metaphysical framework of
Zen enlightening experience. When enlightened, the subject-object framework is
ultimately reduced to “the pure act of SEE”, to which the term ‘no-mind’ accurately
refers (Izutsu 1977, 22). Here regarding the semantics, the concept of no–mind is
comprehensible only if we understand the mind as intrinsically subjective; that is, a
mind can be a mind only if there is a subject. Provided that subjectivity is deontologized or de-essentialized in Zen (or Buddhism, more generally), we are
11

On Izutsu’s examples of kōan, such as Cypress Tree in the Garden of Zhaozhou (778–897), and the
systematization by the Japanese Rinzai Zen Master Hakuin (1685–1768), see Izutsu 1977, 47–55, 117,
n. 1. The kōan is a vast collection of paradoxical sayings, anecdotes, catechism, and mondō (“questions
and answers”) between the historical monks (generally Chinese) and their disciples. Concerning
Japanese Zen meditation, how to use kōan differs between the Sōtō, Rinzai, and Ōbaku Schools. In kōan,
there is no logical or semantic connection between a question (e.g. “what is the essence of Zen
Buddhism?”) and the answer (“the cypress tree in the garden”). There are a variety of non-logical
answers by Zen masters to that same question (Nakamura 1985, 110–111).
12
Izutsu’s formulation, albeit original, is emulated from Tsuji Sato’s linguistic theory of “I See Myself”
in the context of Japanese Zen (Sōtō/Rinzai) schools. What is common between the two scholars is
parsing out the underlying structure of reality in experiencing Zen enlightenment (Izutsu 1977, 20, n.
16; Sato 1968, 296–297). On his different formulation of the dynamic structure of Zen ‘articulationexperience’, see Izutsu 1977, 125–128.
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semantically forced to adopt a negative notion. This state of no-mind is represented by
the verb SEE without brackets, where “consciousness…is its own self in its pristine
purity, a pure Light or sheer Illumination, being illuminated by itself and illuminating
itself” (Izutsu 1977, 32). In the full actualization (enlightenment) of reality in
tathāgatagarbha, following the first three tenets, the subject can see and become pure
void or mind-reality as the whole of I SEE THIS, which is “the eternal now and the
ubiquitous here” (1977, 38–40, 54–55). Izutsu here exemplifies the case of Linji (d.
866), who embodied this state of the cosmic ego, grasping the entire universe (or supraconsciousness) within himself, as the “true man without any rank”.
Finally, Izutsu (1977, 73–77) explicates a Zen Buddhist mode of being “nonintentional” or “non-thinking” (Ch. fēi-sī-liáng; Jp. hishiryō 非思量), by referencing
the Chinese Chan/Zen historical masters, Sengcan (Third Patriarch) and Yaoshan
Weiyan (d. 834). 13 Initially, he dovetails the unenlightened Zen dimension of Iconsciousness with manas (“ego-consciousness”) 14 of the Yogācāra School (also
known as Vijñaptimātratā or “Consciousness-Only” School). Izutsu theorises that in
Zen meditation, which developed from this Indian Mahāyānist doctrine, Iconsciousness at the manas level sinks into a “non-intentional” (hishiryō) dimension
with no subject-object distinction or ‘non-duality’ (Sk. advayatā). This is where supraconsciousness self-illuminates without “intending anything, instead of acting as
‘subject’ as opposed to ‘object’” (1977, 77). Here, carefully, Izutsu regards hishiryō as
a Zen technical term that means the “a-thinking mode of thinking” in “a special
dimension of consciousness” “taking place between the ‘subject’ and the ‘object’”
(1977, 76–77). 15 Non-intentional as it may be, we construe there being the Zen
subject’s aboutness or directedness to the objects of thought. That is, we take it that this
13

Using the example of a renowned mondō (Zen dialogue) between Yaoshan and a visiting monk in the
Tang Dynasty, Izutsu (1977, 156–160) extensively explains hishiryō (“thinking-which-is-non-thinking”
as “a-thinking thinking” on the basis of fushiryō (‘not-to-be-thought-of’) or “something which is
absolutely unthinkable”. This a-thinking form of thinking is regarded as an absolutely “objectless”
thinking as actualised “in the void”, in which the Zen meditator can just see or be actively aware of their
metaphysical state of void (hence also “subjectless”). Izutsu contrasts this Zen mode of thinking with
discursive “thinking…in the Cartesian tradition of the West”, namely, “conscious manipulation of clear
and distinct ideas” (1977, 157). On this stark contrast in the two arguments about aboutness, see the
fourth section.
14
In terms of ego-consciousness, Izutsu (1977, 74) refers to manovijñāna (“mental consciousness”),
which is the sixth consciousness, subsequent to the five sensory consciousnesses. His interpretation is
doctrinally misleading as the seventh manas should be identified with ego- or I-consciousness, which is
self-obsessed “defiled mind”, kliṣṭamanas. This egotistic level is sustained by the eighth and deepest
level of ālayavijñāna (“storehouse-consciousness” or “foundation-consciousness”) in the Yogācāra eight
collections of consciousness. See also Garfield 2002, 138.
15
Izutsu considers “intentio secunda” (i.e. a concept that is inside the mind, unlike intentio prima that is
outside it, or a natural existent) regarding becoming conscious of one’s mental state (e.g. in the
proposition “I feel happy”) (1977, 75–76). For the development of primary and secondary intentions in
Arabic and medieval logic after (Aristotle and) al-Fārābī (d. 950), in which Iztusu may have been well
versed, see Gyekye 1977, 35. Having much to do with the Sautrāntika School in early Buddhism (1977,
75, n. 6), this “non-intentional” state without intentio secunda is not concerned with the subject-object
distinction in Zen. Hence Izutsu does not further explore this mode of intentionality.
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Zen mode of inference is captured as a relational theory of intentionality: there is a
relation between the subject and the object that is being thought about in a way of nonthinking or just seeing. This is because, in a way similar to prajñā (“non-discriminating
cognition” or “wisdom”) in contrast to a basic inferential activity of the mind, vikalpa
(‘discriminative cognition’), the Zen subject can freely relate or refer to objects that
one apprehends in I-consciousness (Izutsu 1977, 12, 30, 72).16 Ultimately, this nonintentional dimension of the meditator is realized “through the yogic, introspective
techniques of zazen” (1977, 75). That is to be enlightened in the void (śūnyatā).
Thus far, if not exhaustively, we summarize that the above interconnected tenets in
Mahāyāna Buddhism laid the solid foundation for Izutsu’s philosophical analysis of
Zen I-consciousness in the state of no-mind. The state is the enlightened supraconsciousness in tathāgatagarbha, wherein the subject can relate to or see the object
in the non-intentional mode (“a-thinking mode of thinking”). Reconstructing Izutsu’s
account, Zen meditation represents this metaphysical dynamism and aboutness of nomind, based on his linguistic and epistemic formulation. These Mahāyānist construals
are key to understanding what Izutsu intends for a true Zen experience. However, as if
unproblematically, these all fit within the Western philosophical and linguistic
framework of the subject and object. In other words, in our critical eyes, Izutsu failed
to do away with the subject-object distinction in explaining Zen; the distinction was
rather a necessary condition for his Zen philosophization. In the next section, we will
examine this indispensable way in which he argues against the Cartesian notion of mind
within substance dualism, which is to contradict Zen metaphysics that Izutsu
philosophizes.
2. DESCARTES’ I-CONSCIOUSNESS VIA
IZUTSU’S ZEN PHILOSOPHISATION
In the first place, Izutsu broaches an argument for Zen supra-consciousness that puts
pressure on at least one ontological worldview: Cartesian dualism (1977, 19). 17 In
comparison with that, in this section, we will develop our analysis of Izutsu’s Zen
metaphysics. Thereby one can more clearly observe Izutsu’s understanding of the
subject-object distinction, within its contradiction to the Cartesian meditation despite
the common effort towards the illumination of the mind.
What is essential to Descartes’ dualism is the postulation of two finite “substances”
16

On the Mahāyānist doctrine of ‘thoughtlessness’ (Jp. munen 無念, “non-conceptual”) stemming from
nirvikalpajñāna (“non-discriminative cognition”) of the “true nature” (Sk. tathatā; Jp. shinnyo 真如),
see the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (Ch. Da-sheng qi-xin lun 大乘起信論); Thich 1974, 76–
77, 121–130. Izutsu metaphysically worked on this sūtra in the form of a posthumous work, which is not
yet translated into English (Izutsu 1993).
17
A critical problem in Izutsu’s Zen philosophization is paying no attention to the (transcendental)
intersubjectivity in, e.g. Husserlian phenomenological reduction (by phenomenological epochē, the
meditating ego is reduced to the meditator’s absolute transcendental ego, wherein the objective world is
constituted intersubjectively). This indicates important nuances that may fill in the gap between subject
and object, as opposed to the Cartesian cogito (Husserl 1960, IV §41; 2001, VI Appendix §§1–2).
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irreducible to each other, namely, res cogitans (thinking thing or one’s mind) and res
extensa (extended objects).18 In this Cartesian worldview, according to Izutsu (1977,
19), the independent personal subject or ego is “a detached onlooker confronting a
world of external objects”. Whilst the Zen meditator has to keep their mind never
detached from external objects, the Cartesian onlooker must prove the independent
existence of their mind that cannot be doubted. For this purpose, it was vital for
Descartes to usher the illumination of the meditator/reader’s mind or I-consciousness
as detached from corporeal things.
Thus, concerning the root of Descartes’ substance dualism, we consider his
celebrated proposition: cogito ergo sum (“I think therefore I exist”).19 Specifically, in
the Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), this cogito proposition is retrospectively
examined with “a simple intuition of the mind”, but not by syllogistically reasoning the
existence from “thought” (cogitatio).20 In this cogito argument, however, Descartes’
theory of the existence of the mind is indeed arguable. As Alison Simmons points out
(2012, 3, 16), he scantly uses the Latin conscientia or the French conscience and never
defines either.21 Without a clear distinction between conscious (i.e. self-reflective) and
unconscious thoughts, the cogito reasoning (as featured in Meditation II) may not
necessarily amount to one’s self-knowledge. Moreover, “the very intelligibility of the
cogito (which constitutes the ultimate foundation of all knowledge in Descartes’
system)” may be questionable (Baker & Morris 1993, 7, n. 32). This is because the
activity of consciousness is not deemed a premise in an argument.22 Hence, Descartes’
18

Cartesian mind-body dualism is nowadays contested and contestable. For example, the two concepts
can be considered neuroscientifically inseparable, because “the mind exists in and for an integrated
organism; our minds would not be the way they are if it were not for the interplay of body and brain
during evolution, during individual development, and at the current moment” (Damasio 1994, xvi). On
neglected aspects of Descartes’ dualism, e.g. theology, empiricism, and a sensitive soul, see Baker &
Morris 1996, 194–198. On a critical review of Cartesian trialism, i.e. mind, body, and the union of them
as a third type of substance, see Nolan 2015, 137, nn. 2–3. Our focus is not on justifying dualism, but
rather on construing Cartesian meditation thereupon, compared to Zen.
19
The cogito proposition, with modifications, is registered in Descartes’ works and correspondences:
“ego cogito, ergo sum” in Principia philosophiæ I §7 (AT VIIIA 7; CSM I 195); “ego cogito, ergo
sum, sive existo” in Meditations (AT VII 140, 205; CSM II 100, 271); “cette vérité: je pense, donc je
suis” in Discours de la méthode IV (AT VI 32; CSM I 127); “dubito, ergo sum, vel, quod idem est:
cogito, ergo sum” in Recherche de la vérité (unfinished manuscript; AT VII 523; CSM II 417), etc.
20
AT VII 23–25, 140; CSM II 16–17, 100; Baker & Morris 1993, 5–6. Descartes argues in Discours IV
(AT VI 33; CSM I 127): “this ‘I’ – that is, the soul by which I am what I am – is entirely distinct from
the body…and [the soul] would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist.” In this cogito
argument, what is to be known is the very “I”, a narrative subject that is consciousness or res cogitans,
whose object is a corporeal thing or res extensa (Kosman 1986, 34–35). One could thereby name the
Cartesian I-consciousness, which becomes aware of the self as detached from any objects in this
meditational exercise.
21
On the more detailed account of Cartesian consciousness in view of attentive reflexibility, see
Lähteenmäki 2007, 182–185; AT VII 559; CSM II 382. On the historical, Aristotelian-scholastic terms
‘conscientia’ and ‘conscius’, which Descartes reworked for his use of self-knowledge or introspection,
see Baker & Morris 1996, 101–118; e.g. AT V 149; CSMK III 335.
22
On the reading that the dictum sum res cogitans (“I am a thinking thing”) is not a definition of one’s
essence denoted by ‘I’, see Frankfurt 2008, 166; e.g. AT VII 35; CSM II 24. On the reading that if it
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cogito argument may be unsound, even if it is deductively valid in setting up dualist
scenarios such as that of the evil demon in the Meditations.
Here the Cartesian cogito, or the mind thinking of one’s existence, is clearly
undermined from Izutsu’s Zen metaphysical perspective that the subject-object
distinction is to be defused. This is because the cogito is (Izutsu 1977, 148):
far from being something that leads us directly to the awareness of the reality of human
existence; on the contrary, cogito is considered the very source of all delusions about
existence; cogito is a distraction that leads us away from an immediate grasp of reality as
it really is.

This signifies that the cogito leads strictly and merely to awareness of the existence of
a thinking thing, whatever that thing ends up being. Izutsu’s suggestion of the cogito
as a root of “delusions” about I-consciousness implies the very Buddhist way of
defusing the “ignorance” (Sk. avidyā) that causes mental “suffering” (duḥkha). This
fits in the Mahāyānist direction of “non-dual” (advaya) reality, which trenchantly
denies the root cause of ātman or svabhāva (“self-essence” or “self-substance”) in
external objects (Suzuki 1998, 166). Therefore, critically, Izutsu regards the Cartesian
conflict between subject and object as “something to be demolished before man begins
to see the reality of himself and of so-called external objects” (1977, 20). In his
refutation of the Cartesian cogito, Izutsu makes use of a Zen expression by Nanquan
(749–835): a flower seen in a dream, where “the subject and object, the man and the
flower, become fused in an indescribably subtle way into an absolute unity” (1977, 9).
In this type of Zen experience, awakening after such a dream, the subject stands to
realize the tathāgatagarbha matrix uniting themselves and their object in a coherent
state of “no-mind” on the supra-conscious level. It can thus be stated that the meditator
must practice the egoless no-mind in order to apprehend the tathāgatagarbha absolute
reality or void.
The above is a brief account of Descartes’ dualist approach to the cogito or Iconsciousness in meditation, through the critical lens of Izutsu’s Zen philosophization.
In the next section, we will examine what the Cartesian and Zen meditators have in
common, by expounding upon Descartes’ meditational practice.
3. COMMON FEATURES BETWEEN ZEN
AND CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS
Izutsu’s metaphysical philosophization of Zen Buddhism is bound to reject Cartesian
dualism. This appears obvious and plain to understand. Nonetheless, the reflection on
and realization of the real self from I-consciousness may potentially manifest key
common features between Zen and Cartesian meditators. This section sheds light on
them comparatively and constructively.
were an argument, the cogito could be an invalid enthymeme lacking a general premise, such as
“whatever thinks, exists”, see Sarkar 2003, 140–142. We will, in the final section, consider a Cartesian
argument about the cogito and its aboutness to objects.
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Whilst withdrawing the mind from bodily senses, Descartes’s Meditations also
invites the reader to a metaphysical engagement in First Philosophy through
meditation. By the first philosophy, Descartes presumably meant to radically reorient
the reader’s most essential praxis, or spiritual exercise. In fulfilling this meditation, he
intended to prove the immortality of the soul (or mind), by clearly and distinctly
discerning it, in distinction from every conception of the body (AT VII 12–13, 153–
154; CSM II 9, 108–109; Baker & Morris 1993, 26). Descartes believes that we are
prone in everyday life to failure to distinguish the self from the body. Hence his
meditation is designed to help us observe this clearly. Contrastingly, in Zen Buddhism,
as Izutsu claimed, it is presumed that we are prone in everyday life to seeing the self as
separate from the other, from the world, from the things we perceive. Hence Zen
meditation is meant to help us overcome this illusory separation.
Unlike the Buddhist approach, Descartes infers the cogito for self-verifying,
incorrigible, and self-independent existence as a thinking thing. Moreover, due to his
Jesuit education, it is highly likely that the Meditations drew on the traditional form of
meditation for the illumination (illuminatio)23 of cogito, in accordance with Christian
literature from St Augustine to St Ignatius of Loyola and Teresa of Ávila.24 To this
effect, the Meditations was not merely a description of meditation, but designed for the
actual practice for one’s soul,25 as Descartes did “not urge anyone to read this book
except those who [were] able and willing to meditate seriously with [him]” (Preface to
the Reader; AT VII 9; CSM II 8; Kosman 1986, 41).
Therefore, by transforming the traditional Christian sense of illumination,
Descartes presents his version of meditational practice in the Meditations. Here, Amélie
Rorty reconstructs “a purely intellectual exercise” of his meditation, by pointing out
Descartes’ “embarrassing, presumptuous echo of the six days of Creation in the six
stages of the Meditations” (Rorty 1986, 8–10, n. 6). The six creational days do not
strictly correspond to the six meditations in Descartes’ work.26 In fact, whilst Stages 4,
23

It should be noted that Descartes does not use this term in Latin, at least not in the Meditations.
Nonetheless, we use it as the valid metaphor of I-consciousness that illuminates its object (or perceiving
it in the light). See AT VII 59; CSM II 41; Lähteenmäki 2007, 180–181, 199–200.
24
Rorty 1986, nn. 1–4; Nawar 2016, 25–27; Mercer 2017, 2542; Underkuffler 2019, 5. On typological
differences between meditation and contemplation in the history of (Western European) Christian
spiritual exercises, see Baier 2019, 85–86. Alternatively, in parallel with the Cartesian cogito meditation,
one may consider the Christian mystical tradition of spiritual exercises, such as Pseudo-Dionysius,
Meister Eckhart, and St John of the Cross, in comparison with Zen Buddhist void/nothingness, see
Williams 2000; Nugent 1996; Ueda 1983.
25
In a way different to traditional Christian contemplation, Zen Buddhism offers physical practices for
meditation, e.g. breathing exercises and zazen (‘seated meditation’). Izutsu (1977, 27–28) explicates the
Japanese Sōtō Zen Master Dōgen’s (1200–1253) teaching of single-mindedly sitting cross-legged in
meditation (shikantaza), which induces the experience of an “epistemological-metaphysical state of
nothingness” (śūnyatā), called “the mind-body dropping off” (shinjindatsuraku). On a more detailed
account of Zen practice, see Ueda 1983, 52–58; Ui 1935, viii.
26
It may well be said that Zen meditation takes countless years for the enlightenment (satori), whereas
our analysis does not go into the actual course of time but the figurative six stages or days of Creation.
This is purely meant for the comparison between the Cartesian and Zen meditations. On the other hand,
never do we ignore stages of “Buddhist meditation” itself in the established, traditional forms, such as
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5, and 6 accord roughly with Meditations IV, V, and VI, Rorty (1986, n. 6) allocates
Stage 2 to a small part between near the end of Meditation I and a few paragraphs after
the beginning of Meditation II (AT IX 17–19 (French); AT VII 22–24 (Latin); CSM II
15–16). This means that much of Meditation II, where Descartes allegedly discovers
the indubitable thing or his self-substance whereby laying out his rationalist
epistemology, is recounted in Stage 3 of the reflecting part (including Meditation III).
However, as is conducive to the comparison with the process of Zen meditation, we
will scrutinise the Cartesian cogito meditation towards illumination, using Rorty’s
reconstruction as follows:27
The six days of Creation in Descartes’ Meditations
Stage 1: Catharsis, detachment, or analysis: a movement from sensation to imagination
and memory, to science and mathematics, to theology.
Stage 2: Skepsis, despair, or nihilism.
Stage 3: Reflection (peripeteia), a reflection that performs a revolutionary change.
Stage 4: Recognition (anagnorisis) of the reflexive, corrective power of the will; the
discovery of the law of noncontradiction as a methodological principle validating
reductio arguments.
Stage 5: Ascension from the psychological to the ontological order; proofs for the
existence of God.
Stage 6: Reconstruction of the world and the self.

The above indicates that Descartes’ Meditations establishes the existence of the self in
six days, where an adequate pause is given for self-understanding between each
meditational day. In other words, Cartesian meditation is reflectively discursive or
narrative across time; it should be grasped logically, albeit not through syllogistic
reasoning or formal logic.28 This aspect may be incompatible with Zen meditation,
which does not follow formal logic in the Aristotelian and Cartesian traditions.29 In Zen
practice, even if logic may be used in the course of experiencing Zen, logic is not a
valid procedure for the formation of ultimate knowledge. Therefore, the outcomes of
the nine stages of jhāna (progressive cessation) in the Pāḷi Canon (Aṅguttara Nikāya 9.31–36; Bhikkhu
Bodhi 2012, 1287–1298).
27
Otherwise, Mercer (2017, 2549–2553) offers another compelling reconstruction based on Teresa of
Ávila’s Interior Castle (1588), from which Descartes presumably learned how to guide the reader of his
Meditations in six steps, when it comes to the deceiver strategy (or demon trope). On a more recent view
of St Francis de Sales’ influence on Descartes’ Meditations, see Underkuffler 2019, 13–15, who is
critical about Mercer’s reading.
28
In Rules for the Direction of the Mind (Rule 10; AT X 406; CSM I 36–37), for instance, Descartes
rejects syllogism and instead grounds his process of reasoning in intuition, which for him is compatible
with mathematical deduction.
29
In effect, Aristotelian logic, taking a dualistic position (either affirmation of the essence or negation
of it) from which Descartes’ philosophy critically emerged, contradicts a “logic of not” (Sk. na pṛthak)
as interpreted in the Diamond Sūtra (Mahāyāna Buddhist text). This Buddhist logic (i.e. neither
affirmation nor negation) is to metaphysically refer or relate to “true void” (Jp. shinkū 真空), to which
Cartesian meditation cannot be truly committed beyond dualism. See Nakamura 1985, 112–113;
Nagatomo 2000, 213–215, 222, 238; Izutsu 1977, 12–14, 28–29.
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theoretical and practical processes for each illuminated/enlightened self should be
divergent. Nevertheless, whilst respecting the analogy with the days of Creation, the
Cartesian meditator’s illumination of self can to some degree be similar to the Zen
practitioner’s enlightenment of self, e.g. in doubting one’s I-consciousness. The
following discusses each stage of Cartesian meditation comparatively.
Stage 1 of catharsis, detachment, or analysis must first discount the argument of
theology, to which Zen meditation cannot commit. However, as instructed in the
preface to the six parts of the Meditations, the reader or meditational subject is required
to proceed with Descartes’ clarifying catharsis of the confused ideas of I-consciousness
by detaching them from the external world. Descartes states thus: “I will devote myself
sincerely and without reservation to the general demolition of my opinions”
(Meditation I; AT VII 18; CSM II 12). This leads to an analytic investigation into the
mind engaged in meditation, as it “shows the true way by means of which the thing in
question was discovered methodically and as it were [epistemically] a priori” (AT VII
155; CSM II 110, clarification added). On the other hand, the Zen meditator takes the
direction of enlightenment in realizing themselves to initially be surrounded by objects,
or the external world. Thus, on our reading, this starting point of Cartesian catharsis of
the subject from what used to be in the world (or object) can be similar to the
methodology that Izutsu intended for the Zen meditational subject, who is prima facie
dualistically discerned from objects. Indeed, according to Izutsu (1977, 8, quoted above
in §1), at first the Zen subject clearly “perceives” external objects or the functional
“correlation between subject and object”, even if the detachment from the object ends
up being mere illusion.
Stage 2 of skepsis, despair, or nihilism expresses a set of existential doubts about
I-consciousness (e.g. dreams and the evil demon). Here, Zen “great doubt” (Jp. taiga
大疑 ; “non-thinking” before “great death” or enlightenment, e.g. in the eighteenthcentury Rinzai Zen Master Hakuin’s case; Kasulis 1981, 114–117) seems akin to the
ancient Greek skepsis. This is a tranquillising method to overcome skeptical despair
(i.e. achieving ataraxia through epochē in Pyrrhonism), which we believe Descartes
intended for his own meditation.30 In addition to Latin medieval literature, this Greek
influence is also closely linked to Cartesian existential angst about any reliable
knowledge for oneself (Burnyeat 1982, 34). Therefore, in this stage through each
systematic doubt, there may be a similarity between Descartes and Zen regarding
nihilism (i.e. uncertainty of the essence of self). In effect, the Cartesian nihilistic despair
– “nothing is certain” (Meditation II; AT VII 24; CSM II 16) – of the tortured existence
of ego must be considered a rhetorical trope (Rorty 1986, 11–12), whereas Zen
meditation should be understood as a stepping stone to the metaphysical-psychological
state of ‘no-mind’ in grappling with despair. However, attempting to deny the essence
30

However, as Burnyeat (1982, 39–40) points out, there is an epistemic difference between Descartes
and the ancient sceptics, such as Sextus Empiricus. Descartes did not bring skepticism into the practical
affairs of life once an indisputable truth of the clear and distinct perception was achieved, whereas the
ancients did aim at the life of skepticism by suspending judgement and applying a criterion of truth. See
e.g. Meditation III (AT VII 35; CSM II 24); Principia I §3 (AT VIIIA 5; CSM I 193); Letter to
Hyperaspistes, August 1641 (AT III 425; CSMK III 191).
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of self in Zen meditational “great doubt” may intellectually correspond to Cartesian
skepticism about I-consciousness.
Stage 3, reflection (peripeteia), 31 plays an epistemic or cognitive role in
engineering a revolutionary change through skeptical doubts. That is,
epistemologically, systematic doubt at some point amounts to something that the
meditator knows for certain. In this stage, on our view, one can associate Cartesian
reflection with inner, introspective perception (Sk. pratyātmagati) or self-realisation
(svasiddhānta) in Zen Buddhism (Laṅkāvatārasūtra; Suzuki 1998, 101–105). On the
whole, the reflection here indicates the concluding doubt that Descartes proposed,
namely, only “my existence” cannot be doubted. As he proceeds with the meditation,
“let whoever [i.e. malin génie or evil demon] can do so deceive me, he will never bring
it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am something” (Meditation
III; AT VII 36; CSM II 25, clarification added). On this basis of self-reflection, whilst
positing “formal reality” in terms of the ontological degrees of ideas, Descartes means
“objective reality” about the representational content of ideas to the intellect or mind
(AT VII 41–42; CSM II 28–29). Hence, putting aside the respective conclusions of Iconsciousness, Cartesian epistemology (the cogito as a piece of immediate knowledge
that only functions in the first-person perspective and the present tense) has a degree of
affinity with Zen introspective cognition. For in a way similar to the Cartesian
reflection via systematic doubt, the Buddhist meditator has to see inside oneself to such
an extent that one may apprehend void.
On the contrary, stage 4, recognition (anagnōrisis) of the reflexive and volitional
power that confirms reductio arguments in Descartes, can hardly be compared with Zen
meditation. The intellectual illumination of the cogito or “a great light in the intellect
was followed by a great inclination in the will” (Meditation IV; AT VII 59; CSM II 41;
Hatfield 1986, 52). The force of skeptical doubts is thereby expelled by this volitional
power; there is nothing external forcing him to assert that. It is purely the meditator’s
own will as opposed to the other beliefs that we had been used to since childhood. Then,
in a way similar to the will of self-convincing in Cartesian meditation, it may be worth
considering the role of volitional force in Zen Buddhism. However, whilst the Cartesian
method ultimately returns to recognize a fixed existence of the self, Zen is coherent in
cognizing the denial of ego: i.e. no point for recognizing the self-essence (Izutsu 1977,
13). This can be understood through Izutsu’s linguistic and epistemic formula (I SEE
THIS) in the state of void, wherein the Zen meditator never returns to see a previous
meaning of fixed I-consciousness. Here arises a fundamental difference between
Cartesian and Zen meditations. Moreover, given that this reductio point about logic
concerns more than epistemology and metaphysics, this stage may be highlighted in
terms of the dissimilarity between Descartes and Zen. The point is that Zen, e.g. in the
use of kōan as one of Zen meditational practices, cannot go about the logical method
31

If we follow Rorty’s characterization, peripeteia can be taken as the Aristotelian rhetorical term for
the twist-in-the-plot. It is used in Aristotle’s Poetics to explain a tragic plot. In this context, it would be
a dramatic change in contrast to the previous existential disorientation. This dramatic quality has some
aesthetic resemblance to the Buddhist satori (“enlightening awake”) in terms of effecting a sudden, lifechanging epistemic moment. See also Husain 2002, 59–60, 96.
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of reductio ad absurdum. This is because the Zen master betrays all logical answers of
the disciple (i.e. kōan does not proceed through logical argumentation) in order for
them to be non-logically enlightened.
As with stage 4, stage 5 of ascension from the psychological to the ontological
order can scarcely be assimilated with Zen meditation. The switch from psychological
to ontological analysis appears to be comparable with the stage of metaphysical relation
(relatio without substantia) of “dependent arising” (pratītyasamutpāda) in Zen
meditation (Izutsu 1977, 23). Nevertheless, one cannot compare Cartesian
metaphysical and ontological causation of the psychological self with Zen deontologising causation (“dependent arising”) in the state of no-mind, as it is the state
of “lacking self-essence” (niḥsvabhāva). In fact, phenomenologically, the Cartesian
meditator constructs a realist ontology based on “a supremely perfect being”, namely,
God (Meditation V; AT VII 65; CSM II 45; Rorty 1986, 16). On the other hand, in Zen
meditation, the psychological ego (subject) is to be embodied in the state of void, or
the metaphysical reality of the tathāgatagarbha matrix (I SEE THIS). For instance, the
Japanese Sōtō Zen founder, Dōgen, describes the mental realization of the empirical
world, such as a flower realized within the ego (Izutsu 1977, 51). Put another way,
there is no divide between subject and object in the enlightened ‘supra-consciousness’
without substantial essence (svabhāva). Hence, we think that this Zen metaphysicalpsychological realization, as de-ontologized, is not pertinent to the way of ascendance
in the Cartesian cogito ontology. This gives rise to further divergent outcomes in the
final stage, namely, ego-substance or no-mind.
Stage 6 of reconstruction of the world and the self may be the most controversial
aspect for a comparison between the two traditions. Unlike the Cartesian cogito, Zen Iconsciousness is not recomposed as a substance in the meditational process, but rather
disassembled or de-ontologized into the absolute no-mind. In this respect, Descartes’
constructive reformulation of the corporeal, external world as “objective reality” and
the self as “a thinking thing” (Meditation VI; AT VII 78–79; CSM II 54–55) results in
an outcome different to the Zen deconstruction of the self. For the Zen subject is to be
integrated into the world as absolute void, that is, nirvāṇa (Izutsu 1977, 60, n. 23).32 In
the former stages 1 to 3, one may be able to retain the resemblance between Cartesian
and Zen meditations. On the other hand, primarily due to stages 4 and 5, it must be
clarified that in stage 6, the consequences between the Cartesian objective world and
the Zen absolute no-mind diverge. However, to our mind, whether or not following
Descartes, a successful meditator will be able to feel “the relaxation of the senses and
the repose of the mind” after the respective exercises (a possible 7th day of

32

See also the “Ten Ox-Herding Pictures” (Jp. jūgyūzu, 十牛圖, originated in twelfth-century China and
well spread in Japan), which schematically portray Zen Buddhist meditation in the ten stages (Ueda 1982,
10–22; 1983, 58–60). In terms of the meditational end of Zen I-consciousness, the tenth or final stage of
the Pictures, entitled “Entering the City with Bliss-Bestowing Hands”, is telling. In the final picture,
when the old herder meets a young human on the road, both reciprocally represent a double self of the
herder themselves in virtue of selflessness: I am “I and thou”, “I and thou” is I (Ueda 1982, 19–21). This
is to return to one’s conventional reality but with the ultimate realization of nirvāṇa.
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philosophical sabbath).33
Hence, through the six Cartesian stages, one can underscore that at least the first
three stages (catharsis, doubt, and reflection) share commonalities regarding
metaphysical meditations between Zen and Descartes. However, from stages 4 to 6
(recognition, ascension, and reconstruction), it can be inferred that the consequences
differ. The final section will explain why the two meditations end up contradicting each
other in their observation and aboutness of I-consciousness.
4. CONTRADICTORY FEATURES:
IZUTSU’S ZEN PHILOSOPHISATION REVISED
In this final section, we will highlight unequivocal differences in the metaphysical role
of I-consciousness: a mental foundation for illumination by one’s epistemological
access to reality in Descartes, and the inner actualization of one’s supra-consciousness,
or no-mind, as enlightenment in Zen Buddhism. By clarifying Izutsu’s discussion, we
will argue that the consequences of the two traditions involve disparate types of
metaphysics. On this comparative ground, finally, it shall be understood how and why
Izutsu’s argument can be undermined in terms of the subject-object “functional
relationship” in a relational theory of intentionality that we reformulate.
Cartesian meditation is a guided reading in order for the reader to reveal “a source
of impersonal, objective judgments that lies hidden in the intellect” (Hatfield 1986, 69).
That is, Descartes’ thoughts are listed in a monological fashion, but at the same time
the reader is guided to objective reality through different steps of reasoning and
intuition. This cognitive exercise can be done only if the reader is logically meditating
with their indubitable cogito, i.e. the essence of I-consciousness (AT VII 28; CSM II
19; Baker & Morris 1996, 13, 167, 205). By contrast, the Zen meditator towards nomind is to betray such an inference as the Cartesian reader (or practitioner) engages in
deriving the source of I-consciousness. Hence, despite a certain degree of
commonalities between the two traditions, they are meditations of very different types.
Overall, Zen meditation (e.g. by relying on kōan practice between the master and
disciple) aims to trigger one’s enlightenment through a paradoxical intuition for the
ultimate elimination of discursive thinking (Izutsu 1977, 151–155). If this is successful,
revising Izutsu’s philosophization, the meditator can introspectively attain the absolute
state of no-mind, which denies their ontologically persisting “self-essence” (svabhāva).
In this context, the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy must be aborted, for Zen reality
must represent “non-duality” (advayatā). As Thomas Kasulis (1981, 57, 61) rightly
puts it, “the state of no-mind is supposed to be outside the bifurcation into subject and
object…reality is what is now happening – it is not outside our experience. For Zen,
33

On Descartes’ own meditational practice for relaxation, see Letter to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia,
28 June 1643 (AT III 692–693; CSMK III 227): “I can say with truth that the chief rule I have always
observed in my studies…has been never to spend more than a few hours a day in the thoughts which
occupy the imagination and a few hours a year on those which occupy the intellect alone. I have given
all the rest of my time to the relaxation of the senses and the repose of the mind” [emphasis added, au
relâche des sens et au repos de l’esprit].
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this has the implication that reality is protean, always changing its shape as soon as we
come into contact with it and try to pin it down.” This type of positionless state that
comprises the changing of the entire reality is, to our mind, what Izutsu meant as the
metaphysical tathāgatagarbha reality. This introspectively defuses the bifurcation of
subject and object within the non-intentional (non-thinking) dimension of “supraconsciousness”, when and where the meditator is seeing void. Therefore, in this Zen
state of being enlightened, the subject-object distinction is something that must be
suspended.
However, as understood thus far, the very distinction of “subject” and “object” was
presumed to be indispensable for Izutsu’s Zen philosophzation. At this juncture, we
contend against Izutsu’s initial assumption (1977, 8):
The most fundamental philosophical assertion of Zen at the outset is that there is a
functional relationship between the subject and the object.

Here we can question: does Zen (“meditation”) ever begin with any subject-object
functional relationship? Izutsu’s mistaken assumption will come to light when we later
consider the Zen mode of intentionality in comparison with the Cartesian one. Indeed,
in attaining Zen enlightenment, revising Izutsu’s linguistic formulas, the verb SEE itself
is the de-ontologized “void” without any brackets between the subject and object.
Therein, the void is absolute. Solely in the state represented by the verb SEE, the Zen
meditator achieves the no-mind or mindfulness in the ordinary but absolute reality of
egoless void, which is “the dynamic field in its entirety and wholeness” (Izutsu 1977,
24). In this realization, not only can one let go of the dichotomy between the subject
and object, and the mind and body, but also set oneself free from time and space into
the eternal now and the ubiquitous here. Therefore, the “I” in Zen enlightenment (satori)
is apperceived and apprehended within the metaphysical-psychological state of nomind, or supra-consciousness. Nonetheless, on our reading, this Zen realization does
not postulate any necessary object for the meditator from the beginning, for they need
not point to any object of thought when meditating.34 The void has no indexicality, in
other words.
In contrast to Zen, however, the Cartesian meditator retrospectively aims to build
analytic reasoning for another metaphysical conclusion (e.g. Discours II; AT VI 11–
22; CSM I 116–122). That is, when the Cartesian cogito plays at least two roles in the
meditation, one of them is to necessarily ground the “certain and unshakable”
knowledge of the nature of the mind, as stated in Meditation II (AT VII 24; CSM II 16;
Nawar 2016, 26; the other role is to defeat the sceptic). The “I” that thinks now will
endure across time, and it is to be ontologically grounded as detached from external
things. Descartes (AT VII 25; CSM II 17) therefore “must conclude that this
proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or
34

Of course, for an instrumental purpose to concentrate on the meditation, Zen beginners do rely on
objects, such as numbers to count each breath (Jp. susokukan, 數息觀, “breath-counting”). However,
this is preliminary. Zen itself fundamentally does not distinguish any object from the practicing subject.
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conceived in my mind” [emphasis added]. Therein can be posited the indubitable Iconsciousness by means of one’s intellectual illumination.35
Hence, one can see that the Cartesian methodology, albeit skeptical in nature,
epistemically applies systematic doubt in order to find the one thing that is indubitable.
In this sense, Descartes carries on the meditation via subtraction, in identifying or
illuminating the undeniable I-consciousness. Contrastingly, Zen meditation proceeds
by systematically dismantling all the ontological assumptions that guide our reasoning,
up to the very extreme of the conflation of object and subject into a non-essential
perspective, that is, absolute void. This can be understood as a process of accretion,
because a metaphysical category, such as void, is given a whole new epistemic role –
the role of enlightening the psychological ego with a true understanding of reality in
tathāgatagarbha.
In the final analysis, in the Cartesian subtractive and Zen accretive approaches to
metaphysical I-consciousness, a fundamental difference of their intentionality or
aboutness should transpire. Maintaining the original sense of the Latin term intentio in
medieval Western philosophy, Izutsu deems the “intentional dimension” of the subject
or I-consciousness to be a dualistic “awareness intending something i.e., directed
toward something; it is an awareness with an objective reference” (1977, 74–75). This
subject-object distinction is the sine qua non of Izutsu’s Zen philosophization.
However, when it comes to the Zen non-intentional thinking, the postulation of the
object as distinguished from the meditator (subject) should be found redundant, pace
Izutsu.
To that end, we must constructively compare the intentional modes of Zen and
Cartesian I-consciousness in each meditation. This comparison can be reconstructed
from the perspective of mental representations that the subject can think (cogitare)
about, refer to, or relate to, in particular, an idea of void.36 The Cartesian meditator tries
but fails to justify a relational theory of intentionality (i.e. there must be a relation
between the meditator and the object that is being thought about), whereas the Zen
meditator – through Izutsu’s philosophizing – justifies it non-intentionally, in the
following arguments:37

35

The Cartesian meditator thus realizes that “the same ‘I’…has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily
things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light” (AT VII 29; CSM II 19; Baker
& Morris 1993, 14).
36
Within mental representations here we include representations without objects, such as “nothingness”
or “void”, which one can intend or think about; see e.g. Bolzano’s Theory of Science (2014 [1837] I §67).
For Bolzano’s relational theory of intentionality, entailing the mode of thinking about ideas of nonexistent objects, e.g. “golden mountain”, “green virtue”, “round square” (Bolzano’s examples of logical
“ideas in themselves”), see Fréchette 2014, 3–5.
37
The former Cartesian argument is inspired by Tim Crane’s anti-realist noneism, or reductive solution
to the problem of non-existence within natural language (2013, 6); Crane’s treatment is in turn inspired
by Husserl’s Logical Investigations (2001 [1901], V §11). The latter Zen argument is inspired by Graham
Priest’s Meinongian solution to the problem of non-existence, based on formal semantics and noneist
quantification (i.e. referring to non-existent but possible objects) (2016, 274); see also Meinong’s Theory
of Objects (1960 [1904], 79).
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Cartesian I-consciousness
1. Assume that I think (cogito) about the void.38
2. But there is, in reality, no such thing as the void, since nothing comes from nothing.39
3. Therefore, a relational theory of intentionality cannot be accepted; my ability to think
about a thing does not require that there is, in reality, that thing. (In thinking of the
void, I may have an idea of the void, but this does not imply that there is, in reality, the
void.)
Izutsu’s Zen I-consciousness
1. Assume a relational theory of intentionality (the subject-object “functional
relationship”), so my ability to think about a thing requires that there is, in reality, that
thing.
2. I can entertain (see) the void in my mind.
3. Therefore, there must be, in reality, such a thing as the void. (This is a metaphysical
accretion of the void implying absolute reality.)

We can see that the Cartesian meditator has a reductio argument (jettisoning P1 as there
is no relation to the void), whilst the Zen meditator embraces the void. Certainly,
premise 1 of the former is rejected in the conclusion. On the other hand, the Cartesian
argument’s conclusion is denied in premise 1 of our reformulation of Izutsu’s argument.
However, premise 1 of the latter is ultimately redundant, because the conclusion can
follow from premise 2 alone by stressing the relational aspect of the mental
representation (as in the formula SEE above mentioned). In fact, the space-time
conditions and one’s circumstances are all taken away when the subject can realise the
empty idea without objectivity. That is, we do not have to presume any “functional
relationship between the subject and the object” (1977, 8) in Zen meditation when we
just see, but cannot point to, the void. Izutsu’s argument is, thus, unsound in our
reformulation.40
The void can be realized in Zen I-consciousness, indeed. This is because the
aboutness (directedness) of Zen I-consciousness to the void is metaphysically
understood given the non-intentional dimension in no bifurcating or discriminative
inference (‘a-thinking mode of thinking’, hishiryō/prajñā). For Zen I-consciousness,
the meditational realization must be non-dual, thereby “non-intentional” (Izutsu 1977,
75):
38

See Meditation III (AT VII 37; CSM II 26): “as far as ideas are concerned, provided they are
considered solely in themselves and I do not refer them to anything else, they cannot strictly speaking
be false; for whether it is a goat or a chimera that I am imagining, it is just as true that I imagine the
former as the latter.” Moreover, in terms of pure understanding distinguished from the imagination of
false ideas (like chimeras), see Meditation VI (AT VII 72–73; CSM II 50–51): “suppose I am dealing
with a pentagon: I can of course understand the figure of a pentagon, just as I can the figure of a chiliagon
[a figure consisting of a thousand sides], without the help of the imagination.”
39
Premise 2 can be formulated from the other crucial propositions for Descartes: ex nihilo nihil fit
(“nothing comes from nothing”) in Meditation III (AT VII 41; IX 33; CSM II 29); AT VII 135; CSM II
97; nihili nulla est proprietas (“nothing has no properties”) in AT IIIA 8, 25; CSM I 196, 210, etc. For
Descartes’ use of the propositions, see Gouhier 1950, 130–131.
40
In passing, Zen monks and meditators would quash Izutsu’s argument that we reformulated in the light
of non-logical procedures towards the enlightenment.
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The very moment I become aware of myself, my I turns into an objectified I, an “object”
among all other “objects”. This is the main reason…why it is so difficult to realise the
“subject” in its pure subjectivity. One can never hope to actualize the pure ego as long as
one remains in the intentional dimension of consciousness.

In this sense, the void itself is de-ontological (without substantial existence): the Zen
subject does not posit objective ‘self-essence’ (svabhāva), nor does they find subjective
‘self-essence’ in the pratītyasamutpāda causal relation. Thus, Izutsu’s Zen
understanding of the relational theory of intentionality is, however called nonintentional, considered to be the climax of the subject’s metaphysical accretion of
absolute void in what he meant by ‘supra-consciousness’ or ‘no-mind’. Nonetheless, it
is clear that Izutsu’s argument should not be reconstructed by relying on the standard
subject-object relationship posited in theories of intentionality.
A full analysis of the Zen conception of “void” (śūnyatā) is beyond the scope of
this article (but see, e.g. Thich 1974, ch. 5; Nishitani 1982, ch. 4).41 That being so, it
will now suffice to say that Zen meditation is a robust anti-essentialist stance, in
contrast with the Cartesian strategy of overcoming skeptical doubts. More importantly,
through this comparative engagement, we are now in the position to see how and why
Izutsu’s Zen philosophization is criticized: the subject-object relationship is not
functional in Zen.
5. CONCLUSION
To conclude, we have fleshed out the irreducible distinctions of the ego processes in
Zen and Cartesian meditations towards their respective ends. For this purpose, we
reviewed Izutsu’s Zen philosophization using Mahāyāna Buddhist tenets that converge
at the de-ontologized state of no-mind. Criticizing the subject-object distinction that
Izutsu presupposed tout court, however, we can now understand that the goals of Iconsciousness in the two traditions are roundly divergent. Revising his Zen
metaphysics, thus resoundingly, two types of metaphysical I-consciousness and
intentionality of their mental states to objects can be summarized as below:
Cartesian I-consciousness: towards the undoubted existence of oneself in this reality across
time through the bifurcating meditation, whence one can refer to objective reality as
illuminated by the light of certainty.
Zen I-consciousness: into the no-mind apprehending oneself in this reality now through the
meditation without bifurcation or discrimination, whence one can see the void or absolute
reality through enlightenment.

41

Nishitani (1982, 164) comprehensively yet radically philosophizes the field of śūnyatā as absolute
nothingness, or “nothingness-sive-being, being-sive-nothingness”, where all beings are “absolutely
independent” and “essentially one”. This standpoint may be arguable, compared to Izutsu’s antiessentialist Zen philosophisation of nothingness or void.
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